The case revolves around a dispute between US Swimming and FINA concerning the late entry of Irish swimmer S. into the 400-meter freestyle event at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. US Swimming challenged FINA's decision to allow S. to compete after the July 5, 1996, entry deadline, arguing that the substitution violated FINA's rules. The Irish NOC had requested the change on July 17, replacing another swimmer with S. FINA initially rejected the substitution but reversed its decision after the IOC indicated that such changes could be permitted up to 24 hours before the event, prioritizing athlete flexibility. US Swimming then appealed to the CAS ad hoc Division, seeking to overturn FINA's ruling.
The CAS panel, operating under the Olympic Charter and Swiss law, examined whether FINA's decision conflicted with its own regulations. US Swimming contended that FINA By-Law 6.3.2 required entries to adhere to the IOC's deadline, while FINA argued that the IOC's flexibility overrode its rules. The panel rejected FINA's claim that it lacked authority to challenge IOC decisions, asserting that FINA remained accountable for its rulings. The panel also noted ambiguity in FINA's rules regarding whether "entry" referred solely to athlete identification or included specific events, leaving room for interpretation.
The IOC's practice of allowing exceptions, particularly for logistical challenges faced by smaller federations, was a key consideration. The IOC Sports Director testified that rigid deadlines would disadvantage many athletes, and the Irish NOC acted in good faith based on advice from the Atlanta organizing committee (ACOG). The panel recognized that late event changes were common in past Olympics, despite FINA's preference for stricter enforcement. Ultimately, the panel upheld FINA's decision, deferring to the IOC's authority and the established flexible practice. The ruling acknowledged that while stricter deadlines might enhance predictability, the existing system accommodated exceptions to support athletes.
Ireland clarified that NOCs, not national federations, communicated entries to organizing committees. The Irish representative testified that ACOG officials had informed them on July 5 that event changes for already-entered athletes could be made as late as July 20. Acting on this advice, Ireland made the substitution on July 17. This testimony was uncontested and accepted by the panel, which noted that last-minute event changes had been a longstanding practice, even if FINA favored stricter rules. The panel emphasized that while stricter rules might offer benefits like predictability, the current flexible approach was not explicitly prohibited.
The panel highlighted that FINA could enforce stricter deadlines but pointed out that the cited By-Law only referred generally to official forms submitted to the organizing committee. The panel stressed that as long as general rules applied, the flexible regime must be followed. The IOC's Guide to Entries supported this practice, allowing exceptions for formally deficient entries to accommodate diverse sports and NOCs. The panel cautioned that any shift to stricter rules should result from deliberate policy discussions rather than sudden exclusions that unfairly penalize athletes.
The panel underscored the severe consequences of upholding US Swimming's appeal, which would unjustly exclude athletes who acted in good faith. The Irish NOC and swim team followed procedures they reasonably believed were permissible, and there was no evidence that flexibility caused undue prejudice to other competitors. Ultimately, the CAS ad hoc Division ruled that US Swimming failed to prove S.'s participation violated clear rules, and the application was dismissed. The case illustrates the ongoing tension between regulatory precision and practical flexibility in international sports governance.