The case revolves around three Russian cyclists—Kiril Sveshnikov, Dmitry Sokolov, and Dmitry Strakhov—who appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) against the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) after being deemed ineligible for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. This decision followed the McLaren Report, which exposed a state-sponsored doping scheme in Russia, prompting the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to establish criteria for assessing Russian athletes' eligibility. Initially, the UCI confirmed the cyclists' eligibility but later identified them as potentially implicated in doping based on the report. The cyclists argued they were denied sufficient evidence and a fair opportunity to defend themselves. The CAS panel ruled that the cyclists lacked standing to appeal because they had withdrawn their action against the UCI, the only party whose decision directly affected them. The panel emphasized that only parties with a concrete legal interest can appeal, and since the cyclists no longer challenged a decision impacting their legal position, their appeal was inadmissible.
The dispute highlighted procedural complexities in doping-related eligibility cases. The cyclists, through the Russian Cycling Federation, requested the UCI and IOC to disclose evidence against them, but the UCI maintained confidentiality, sharing names only with the IOC. The IOC's Review Panel, consulting a CAS expert, upheld the cyclists' ineligibility, citing failure to meet its criteria. The cyclists then filed with the CAS Ad Hoc Division, initially targeting both the IOC and UCI but later focusing solely on the UCI. They sought to invalidate the UCI's decisions and compel document disclosure, but the UCI argued it had not declared the cyclists ineligible and had correctly applied its regulations. The CAS Panel confirmed its jurisdiction under Olympic rules and Swiss law, noting the UCI's statement might not qualify as a formal decision under Swiss Civil Code Article 75, which requires a ruling with legal consequences.
The Panel concluded the UCI's statement did not adversely affect the cyclists' legal position, as their exclusion stemmed from the IOC's separate decision. Under Swiss law and CAS jurisprudence, only members harmed by an association's decision have standing to appeal, and the cyclists failed to meet this criterion. Their grievances were ultimately directed at the IOC, which was no longer a party to the case. The Panel dismissed the appeal, ruling the cyclists lacked standing and their claims were moot. The case underscores the intricate balance between athlete eligibility, anti-doping regulations, and procedural fairness in sports arbitration, while clarifying the legal standards for appealable decisions under CAS and Swiss law.