The case centers on Arturo Miranda, a diver nominated by the Canadian Olympic Association to represent Canada at the 2000 Sydney Olympics. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) ruled him ineligible under Paragraph 2 of the Bye-law to Rule 46 of the Olympic Charter, which requires an athlete to have been a national of their representing country for at least three years unless the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of their previous country consents to a shorter period. Miranda, who had previously represented Cuba, did not obtain such consent from the Cuban NOC. He appealed the IOC's decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) ad hoc Division, but his initial application was dismissed. A subsequent appeal on September 23, 2000, included additional evidence and legal opinions from both Miranda and the Cuban Olympic Committee.
Miranda was born in Cuba in 1971 and represented the country in diving until 1991. After retiring in 1992, he married a Canadian woman in 1994, moved to Canada in 1995 as a permanent resident, and became a Canadian citizen in 1999. Despite residing in Canada for five years and participating in Canadian diving programs, Miranda retained his Cuban passport and visited Cuba occasionally. The Cuban NOC argued he remained a Cuban national under Cuban law, while Miranda's legal team contended he had become stateless upon leaving Cuba, having lost residency rights there.
The CAS panel, applying the Olympic Charter and general principles of law, rejected Miranda's claim. It found that while Miranda might have been de facto stateless, he had not formally lost his Cuban nationality, meaning the three-year rule still applied. The panel emphasized that the Olympic Charter's nationality provisions must align with international law, and Miranda's situation did not qualify for an exception. The decision upheld the IOC's ruling, barring Miranda from competing for Canada in Sydney.
In a subsequent appeal, Miranda's team argued he was stateless, citing expert opinions and the precedent of Perez v. IOC, where the CAS ruled an athlete could be considered de facto stateless even with formal nationality. However, the panel distinguished Miranda's case, noting he was not a defector, maintained good relations with Cuba, and faced no legal consequences or property confiscation during visits. The panel concluded Miranda had not proven de facto statelessness, as he provided no evidence of actual mistreatment or denial of protection by Cuba. His inability to naturalize quickly in Canada did not equate to statelessness.
The Cuban Olympic Committee presented evidence countering Miranda's claims, and the panel noted he failed to show he was treated differently by Cuba compared to other emigrants. Miranda's choice to settle in a country with a lengthy naturalization process, whether due to unavoidable delays or his own actions, further complicated his case. The panel expressed sympathy but dismissed the application, upholding the IOC's decision that Miranda's participation required Cuban approval. The CAS ad hoc Division ultimately ruled to dismiss the September 23, 2000, application, reinforcing the strict application of Olympic nationality rules and the challenges athletes face when changing national representation.