The case of Arturo Miranda revolves around his eligibility to compete for Canada in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, following his change of nationality from Cuba. Miranda, a former Cuban diver who last competed internationally in 1991, retired in 1992, married a Canadian woman in 1994, and moved to Canada in 1995 as a permanent resident before obtaining Canadian citizenship in 1999. Despite his integration into Canadian society and resumption of competitive diving, his participation was contested under Rule 46 of the Olympic Charter, which mandates a three-year waiting period for athletes who change nationality before representing their new country, unless the relevant National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and International Federations (IFs) agree to waive this requirement. The Cuban Olympic Committee refused to grant such a waiver, leading the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to enforce the waiting period and declare Miranda ineligible.
Miranda appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that his landed immigrant status in Canada since 1995 should be considered as acquiring Canadian nationality, thereby satisfying the three-year requirement by 2000. The CAS panel rejected this claim, ruling that Canadian nationality was only conferred upon citizenship in 1999, making him ineligible under the Charter. Miranda also contended that the Cuban Olympic Committee’s refusal was arbitrary and violated Olympic principles of fairness and non-discrimination, especially since the Cuban diving federation had no objection to his participation. However, the panel upheld the Cuban NOC’s absolute discretion in such matters, finding no evidence of abuse or bad faith in their decision.
The case underscores the strict application of Olympic eligibility rules, even in situations where athletes have legitimately changed national affiliation and established new lives. While the panel acknowledged the hardship faced by Miranda—who left Cuba for personal rather than political or financial reasons—it emphasized the autonomy of NOCs in these decisions. The ruling highlighted the distinction between citizenship and nationality in international law, reinforcing that the IOC is not obligated to investigate the reasons behind an NOC’s refusal. The panel expressed regret over the outcome and recommended a review of the relevant bylaws to prevent similar hardships in the future, but ultimately dismissed Miranda’s appeal, barring him from competing in the Sydney Games. The case illustrates the tension between regulatory discretion and the Olympic Movement’s broader principles of athlete welfare and inclusivity.