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2002 Athletics / Athlétisme Doping Jurisdiction denied English Appeal Procedure

Parties & Representatives

Appellant: Andrea Longo
Appellant Representative: Federico Cecconi; Marco Cecconi

Arbitrators

President: Hans Nater

Decision Information

Decision Date: March 28, 2003

Case Summary

The case revolves around Andrea Longo, an Italian track and field athlete who tested positive for Nandrolone metabolites during a competition in June 2001. Following the confirmation of the positive test, Longo was suspended for two years by the Italian Athletics Federation (FIDAL). Longo appealed the suspension, claiming the banned substance originated from a contaminated food supplement, Branched Chain Amino Acids (BCAA), which laboratory analyses later confirmed. Despite this evidence, FIDAL’s appeal committee upheld the suspension. Longo then sought early reinstatement under IAAF Rule 60.9, which permits reinstatement in exceptional circumstances. The IAAF Council rejected his application in July 2002, leading Longo to appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The primary issue before CAS was whether it had jurisdiction to review the IAAF Council’s decision under Article R47 of the CAS Code, which governs appeal arbitration proceedings. The IAAF argued that CAS lacked jurisdiction because the decision was administrative, pertaining to the execution of a sanction rather than the sanction itself. CAS agreed, ruling that decisions on early reinstatement under Rule 60.9 are administrative and discretionary, not disciplinary, and thus not subject to appeal under CAS jurisdiction. The tribunal emphasized that the nature of the decision, not the authority making it, determines whether an appeal is possible. Since the IAAF Council’s decision was administrative, CAS concluded it had no authority to review it.

Longo contended that the decision’s disciplinary nature should determine CAS jurisdiction, citing precedents where appeals against administrative bodies in disciplinary matters were allowed. However, the Sole Arbitrator rejected this argument, stating that the IAAF Council’s decision on early reinstatement is an administrative act of discretion, not a disciplinary review. The decision does not alter the original sanction but considers whether exceptional circumstances warrant early reinstatement. The Arbitrator further noted that IAAF Rules 21.2 and 21.3, which outline appealable disputes, did not apply to Longo’s case, as his request for reinstatement was not a dispute between parties but an administrative matter.

The ruling clarified that while athletes have two separate remedies—appealing the original sanction or applying for early reinstatement—the latter does not constitute a legal remedy under Article R47 of the CAS Code. The IAAF maintained that its rules do not provide for appeals against Council decisions on reinstatement, and the Arbitrator agreed, emphasizing that such applications are not disputes as defined by IAAF Rule 21.2. The decision underscores the distinction between disciplinary sanctions and administrative decisions, reinforcing that the latter are not subject to judicial review by CAS.

Ultimately, CAS dismissed Longo’s appeal, upholding the IAAF’s rejection of his early reinstatement request. The case highlights the procedural boundaries of CAS jurisdiction and the specific conditions under which appeals against sports governing bodies are permissible. It also clarifies that discretionary administrative decisions, such as those on early reinstatement, fall outside the scope of CAS review, reinforcing the limited authority of CAS in such matters.

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