The case revolves around a Spanish cyclist, O., who was accused of doping during the 2001 Tour de France after his urine samples tested positive for recombinant erythropoietin (EPO). The analysis was conducted by the Châtenay-Malabry laboratory using a method endorsed by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Both the initial and counter-analysis confirmed the presence of EPO, prompting the UCI to initiate disciplinary proceedings. However, the Real Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC) dismissed the case, citing insufficient evidence and questioning the reliability of the testing method, invoking the principle of presumption of innocence.
The UCI appealed the RFEC's decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that the detection of recombinant EPO alone constitutes a doping violation, as it does not occur naturally in the human body. The UCI defended the laboratory's method, noting that the cyclist's samples showed 96.3% and 89.8% basic isoforms, significantly exceeding the 80% threshold used as a precautionary measure. The UCI also referenced scientific publications supporting the method and its adoption by other accredited laboratories.
The RFEC's dismissal was based on concerns about the method's scientific validity, citing a report from the University of Santiago de Compostela that claimed the technique lacked reproducibility and comprehensive validation. The RFEC also pointed to inconsistencies in another cyclist's test results and a statement from the laboratory director acknowledging the method's imperfections. Additionally, the RFEC argued that the IOC's approved protocol for EPO detection required both urine and blood tests, which were not conducted in this case.
O. and the RFEC further contested the UCI's handling of the case, highlighting procedural flaws such as the denial of O.'s request for a counter-analysis at a different lab and errors in the counter-analysis procedure. They also questioned the scientific validity of the Paris lab's method, noting the lack of established thresholds for recombinant EPO positivity and inconsistencies in urine sample handling, such as freezing and pH variations, which could compromise results. O. contended that imposing sanctions without clear evidence of doping violated his constitutional right to work and the European Convention on Human Rights.
The CAS panel ruled in favor of the UCI, upholding the validity of the laboratory's method and confirming the doping violation. The decision reinforced that the presence of recombinant EPO in urine alone is sufficient to establish doping, given its unnatural occurrence in the human body. The CAS dismissed the RFEC's arguments regarding methodological flaws, citing the lack of credible scientific challenges to the technique and its widespread acceptance in anti-doping efforts. The panel also rejected O.'s procedural and human rights arguments, stating that such protections apply to judicial proceedings, not disciplinary actions by sports federations.
Under UCI regulations, the standard sanction for such an offense was a minimum four-year suspension, but the CAS reduced it to one year effective and two years suspended, considering O.'s age (29) and the fact that it was his first offense. The effective suspension ended on March 16, 2003, and he was fined CHF 2,000. The ruling underscored the strict enforcement of anti-doping regulations while allowing for mitigated sanctions under specific circumstances. The decision highlighted the importance of reliable testing methods in maintaining fair competition in professional cycling.