The case of Charline Van Snick, a Belgian judo athlete, revolves around a doping violation during the 2013 World Judo Championships in Rio de Janeiro. Van Snick tested positive for cocaine metabolites in a urine sample taken after her competition on August 26, 2013. Cocaine is a prohibited substance under the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and the International Judo Federation (IJF) Anti-Doping Rules (ADR). The IJF imposed a two-year suspension, annulled her competition results, and withdrew her medals and prizes. Van Snick denied knowingly ingesting cocaine and proposed alternative explanations, including sabotage by a third party or accidental contamination through beverages. She consulted toxicology expert Dr. Jan Tytgat, whose hair analysis found no evidence of long-term cocaine use. She also highlighted negative doping tests before and after the event. The IJF’s Medical Commission provisionally suspended her, and the B-sample confirmed the initial findings. The IJF’s Executive Committee upheld the sanctions, citing strict liability, which holds athletes responsible for any prohibited substances in their bodies, regardless of intent.
Van Snick appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing she met the burden of proof under the "balance of probabilities" standard, suggesting sabotage or accidental contamination was plausible. The IJF maintained she failed to prove how the substance entered her system. The CAS panel evaluated whether Van Snick demonstrated, with at least 51% likelihood, that the cocaine resulted from sabotage or unintentional ingestion. While CAS jurisprudence allows athletes to rebut strict liability by proving third-party tampering or inadvertent consumption, the panel found Van Snick’s evidence—including hair tests and speculative sabotage claims—insufficient. The panel emphasized strict liability’s role in ensuring sporting fairness and the need for athletes to exercise extreme caution to avoid contamination.
The CAS upheld the IJF’s decision, confirming the two-year suspension and result annulment. The ruling reinforced strict liability in anti-doping cases while acknowledging the theoretical possibility of sabotage if credible evidence is presented. Van Snick’s inability to conclusively establish the source of the cocaine led to the dismissal of her appeal. However, in a subsequent review, the CAS panel reconsidered the evidence, including the low concentration of cocaine metabolites and the improbability of intentional use given Van Snick’s high ranking and clean doping history. Hair analysis confirmed no long-term use, and experts concluded the trace amounts were negligible and unlikely to enhance performance. The panel found sabotage by a third party the most plausible explanation, though insufficient evidence identified the perpetrator.
The CAS partially upheld Van Snick’s appeal, annulling the two-year suspension under WADC Article 10.5.1, which allows for no-fault scenarios, including sabotage. The panel determined Van Snick took reasonable precautions and could not foresee tampering. However, the disqualification of her competition results remained, as anti-doping rules mandate annulment regardless of intent. The case underscores the tension between strict anti-doping enforcement and fairness in contamination claims, highlighting the challenges athletes face in proving unintentional ingestion. The final ruling balanced the principles of strict liability with the need for contextual and scientific evidence in doping adjudications.