The case involves an appeal filed by T. with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) against the decision of the French National Olympic and Sports Committee (CNOSF) to endorse the selection of female tennis players for the Sydney Olympics as proposed by the French Tennis Federation (FFT). T., who was not included in the selection, sought arbitration to qualify for the Olympics, arguing that CAS had jurisdiction under Article 74 of the Olympic Charter, which stipulates that disputes related to the Olympics must be submitted exclusively to CAS. On August 11, 2000, CAS formally notified CNOSF of the appeal and requested its position on jurisdiction and the composition of the arbitral panel. CNOSF responded the same day, asserting that T. was challenging a conciliation proposal that could not be appealed and that the appeal was inadmissible because it targeted the wrong party, as the dispute was with FFT, not CNOSF. T. countered on August 14, clarifying that she was contesting CNOSF's decision to present the selection excluding her, citing French law which designates CNOSF as responsible for registering athletes for the Olympics.
The legal analysis focused on whether there was an arbitration agreement between T. and CNOSF that would grant CAS jurisdiction. According to Article R47 of the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, an appeal can be made if the statutes or regulations of the sports body provide for it or if there is a specific arbitration agreement, provided all prior legal remedies have been exhausted. Article R52 of the Code requires CAS to proceed unless there is clearly no arbitration agreement. The decision here was limited to determining whether such an agreement existed prima facie, leaving the question of jurisdiction to the arbitral panel if one was found. It was established that CNOSF's statutes did not contain a specific arbitration clause in favor of CAS. The case then turned to whether the parties had a separate arbitration agreement for this dispute.
CAS referenced a prior ruling (TAS 96/158 FIDAL v. IAAF) which emphasized that an arbitration agreement, though not necessarily contractual or signed, must clearly demonstrate mutual consent in writing. T. relied on Article 74 of the Olympic Charter, but CAS had previously ruled (in TAS NAG 1 Puerto Rico Ski Federation v. IOC) that only accredited Olympic athletes could invoke this provision, not those merely seeking participation. Since T. was not an accredited athlete, she could not rely on Article 74 to establish CAS jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division found that the condition under Article R52 for initiating arbitration was not met, as there was no valid arbitration agreement. Consequently, CAS could not proceed with T.'s appeal. The final decision, rendered in private, stated that CAS would not implement an arbitral procedure in response to T.'s appeal filed on August 11, 2000. The case underscores the necessity of a clear arbitration agreement for CAS jurisdiction and limits the application of the Olympic Charter's dispute resolution clause to accredited Olympic athletes.