The case involves a doping violation by cyclist F., licensed by the Italian Cycling Federation (FCI) and sanctioned by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). F. tested positive for testosterone and methenolone during the 1997 Tour de Suisse and later for methyltestosterone metabolites during the Tour de Pologne. The UCI argued these were separate offenses, while F. claimed they resulted from a single act. The FCI initially imposed separate penalties: a six-month suspension and fine for the Tour de Suisse, followed by an additional one-year suspension and fine for the Tour de Pologne. F. appealed to the FCI's appeals commission (CAF), which reduced the penalties, treating the violations as a single offense under the principle of "ne bis in idem" (no double jeopardy). The UCI then appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), seeking reinstatement of the original penalties or modification of the CAF's decision.
The CAS had to determine whether the violations were separate offenses or a single act, its jurisdiction, and the appropriate penalties. F. argued the UCI's appeal was filed too late, as the 30-day deadline under UCI rules had expired. The UCI countered that the deadline only began upon receiving the FCI's complete decision, which included signatures and a full rationale. The CAS ruled the appeal was timely, as the initial letter from the FCI lacked essential elements. The CAS also confirmed its jurisdiction under cycling regulations, which designate it as the final arbiter for doping disputes.
The CAS examined whether the CAF had authority over the appeal, noting that UCI rules require disputes to be submitted directly to the CAS unless national law mandates an internal appeal. The UCI argued Italian law did not require such an appeal, while F. claimed Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) rules did. The CAS found no evidence supporting F.'s claim and ruled the CAF lacked jurisdiction, meaning F. should have appealed directly to the CAS. However, the CAS proceeded to review the case on its merits, recognizing F.'s intent to appeal.
Regarding the violations, the CAS determined the positive tests constituted separate offenses, as they involved different substances and occurred at distinct times. The first offense (Tour de Suisse) had already been finalized with a six-month suspension. For the second offense (Tour de Pologne), the CAS imposed a 12-month suspension, with five months suspended, a CHF 4,000 fine, and disqualification from the Tour de Pologne. Mitigating factors included F.'s eventual admission of guilt and the fact that the second offense occurred before sanctions for the first were imposed, reducing his subjective culpability. The CAS also considered precedents like the "Festina affair," where similar penalties were applied.
Ultimately, F. was required to serve seven months of suspension, effective from November 1, 1998, to March 31, 1999, with five months already served in 1998. The CAS annulled the CAF's decision and issued a new ruling, emphasizing fairness and consistency in anti-doping enforcement. The case highlights the complexities of doping adjudication, including jurisdictional conflicts, procedural timelines, and the interpretation of multiple violations. It underscores the CAS's role in ensuring consistent application of anti-doping regulations while balancing athletes' procedural rights. The decision reaffirms the primacy of international federation rules over national regulations in doping disputes involving international competitions.