The case revolves around Eduardo Julio Urtasun, a physical trainer, who appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) after FIFA declined jurisdiction over his employment dispute with the Mexican football club Tigres de la UANL. The dispute arose when the club terminated the contracts of the entire technical team, including Urtasun, following the hiring of a new coach. Urtasun and his colleagues initially filed claims with the Mexican Football Federation's dispute resolution body, which also declined jurisdiction. FIFA later accepted the claims of the coach and technical assistant but rejected Urtasun's, arguing that physical trainers were not covered under its regulations. Urtasun contested FIFA's decision, leading to a CAS appeal.
The central issue before CAS was whether FIFA's letter denying jurisdiction constituted a formal and appealable decision under Article 63 of FIFA Statutes. CAS determined that the letter, issued by FIFA's Players' Status Committee, was indeed a final decision as it definitively refused to intervene and directed Urtasun to seek relief elsewhere, thereby affecting his legal situation. This met the criteria for CAS jurisdiction, making the appeal admissible.
On the merits, CAS examined whether Urtasun, as a physical trainer, qualified as a "coach" under FIFA regulations, which would grant FIFA jurisdiction over his employment dispute. Applying Swiss legal principles, CAS interpreted the term "coach" through grammatical, historical, systematic, and teleological methods. It concluded that a coach's role involves leading the team and making tactical decisions, while a physical trainer's responsibilities are limited to player fitness and do not constitute a football-specific occupation. FIFA's regulations and longstanding practice explicitly exclude physical trainers from its jurisdictional scope for employment disputes, unlike coaches.
Urtasun argued that his contract was linked to the coach's contract, forming a "waterfall employment contract" where his termination was contingent on the coach's dismissal. However, CAS rejected this argument, stating that neither Swiss law nor FIFA regulations support the idea that disputes arising from such linked contracts must be heard by the same jurisdiction. Urtasun's contracts with the club were distinct, and the termination clause alone did not establish jurisdictional parity with the coach's claims. Additionally, Urtasun's contracts included a clause specifying dispute resolution in the labor courts of Nuevo León, further undermining his case for FIFA jurisdiction.
CAS also dismissed Urtasun's claim that he qualified as an "official" under FIFA Statutes, clarifying that FIFA's jurisdiction does not automatically extend to all disputes involving officials, especially employment matters typically handled by civil courts. The ruling reinforced the distinction between football-specific roles, like coaches, and non-specific roles, like physical trainers, under FIFA's regulatory framework.
Ultimately, CAS upheld FIFA's decision, affirming that physical trainers fall outside FIFA's jurisdictional scope for employment disputes. The case underscores the importance of precise contractual and jurisdictional definitions in sports-related employment disputes and clarifies that contractual ties to a coach do not grant FIFA jurisdiction over non-coaching roles. The appeal was dismissed, and Urtasun was directed to pursue his claim in the civil courts of Nuevo León. The decision highlights the procedural challenges in resolving employment disputes in international football and reinforces the boundaries of FIFA's dispute resolution mechanisms.