The case revolves around a doping violation involving a swimmer, R., and her coach, V., during the 1995 World Swimming Short Course Championships in Brazil. R. tested positive for propoxyphene metabolite, a banned substance under FINA and IOC regulations. The substance was traced to a tablet provided by V., who claimed he believed it was a harmless headache medication similar to Panadol. The tablet, identified as Di Gesic, contained dextropropoxyphene, a banned narcotic analgesic. V. argued he had no intent to dope the athlete, as the tablet was old and its packaging illegible, and he was unaware of its banned status.
FINA’s Executive initially suspended V. for two years under the strict liability principle, which holds coaches accountable for providing banned substances regardless of intent. The suspension was later reduced to one year by the FINA Bureau upon appeal, considering mitigating circumstances such as V.’s lack of deliberate wrongdoing and the minimal performance-enhancing effect of the substance. R. received only a warning, as the amount detected was very low, and her subsequent test was negative.
V. appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), seeking to overturn the suspension or further reduce the penalty. CAS upheld the strict liability principle, affirming that coaches bear responsibility for substances they provide to athletes, even without intent to dope. However, it recognized mitigating factors, such as V.’s lack of malice and the context of the incident. The case underscores the importance of due diligence by coaches in verifying medications and highlights the balance between strict anti-doping enforcement and fairness in disciplinary measures.
The core legal issue revolved around the interpretation of FINA's doping rules, particularly whether the coach's actions required intent to constitute a violation. V. argued that the rules should require a "guilty mind," but FINA contended that the act of providing a banned substance alone was sufficient for liability. CAS agreed with FINA, ruling that the rules were interconnected and that V.’s act of providing the banned substance established liability regardless of intent.
V. also contested the severity of the penalty, arguing it was excessive. The panel noted inconsistencies in FINA's sentencing policy, particularly the disparity between V.’s suspension and R.’s warning. Mitigating factors included V.’s cooperation, the non-performance-enhancing nature of the substance, and the personal and professional consequences he faced. The panel acknowledged these factors but emphasized V.’s failure to consult the team doctor, a significant lapse in judgment.
Ultimately, CAS partially granted the appeal, reducing the suspension to seven months, ending on June 30, 1996. The decision balanced the strict liability framework of anti-doping regulations with fairness, considering V.’s lack of intent and the disproportionate impact of the penalty. The ruling reinforces the importance of enforcing anti-doping rules while allowing for nuanced consideration of mitigating circumstances in disciplinary decisions. The case serves as a reminder of the rigorous standards applied in doping violations and the limited defenses available to those involved, even inadvertently.