The case involves a Lithuanian ballroom dancer, referred to as D., who appealed a decision by the International DanceSport Federation (IDSF) regarding a doping violation. During an IDSF Grand Slam competition in Stuttgart in August 2006, D. tested positive for Sibutramine, a prohibited stimulant listed under the IDSF Anti-Doping Code (IADC). The substance was detected in both her urine samples. D. claimed the positive result was due to her inadvertent ingestion of a herbal slimming product, "Meizitang," which contained Sibutramine without listing it on the label. She argued she had no intention to enhance her performance and sought either no sanction or a reduced penalty under the IADC, as Sibutramine is classified as a "Specified Substance," which allows for more lenient sanctions if unintentionally consumed.
The IDSF Disciplinary Council (DC) found D. guilty of a doping violation but acknowledged Sibutramine as a Specified Substance, reducing her ineligibility period from the standard two years to three months, effective from the date of her provisional suspension (14 September 2006). The DC rejected her claim of "No Fault or Negligence," stating that athletes bear responsibility for what they consume. D. appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), challenging the DC's decision. The CAS panel examined the case under Swiss law and confirmed that Sibutramine's classification as a Specified Substance did not require further evaluation of its potential for unintentional use. It agreed that D. lacked intent to enhance performance, as her goal was slimming rather than competitive advantage, but upheld the principle that athletes must exercise caution with supplements.
The CAS ultimately affirmed the three-month sanction, emphasizing that the proximity of a major sporting event during the ineligibility period did not justify altering the penalty. The ruling reinforced the balance between strict anti-doping enforcement and recognizing mitigating factors for Specified Substances. The case underscores the importance of athlete diligence in supplement use and the role of disciplinary bodies in upholding anti-doping regulations while considering individual circumstances.
The CAS also addressed procedural issues, including the admissibility of D.'s appeal, which the IDSF contested due to a three-day delay in filing. The panel rejected this argument, noting the appeal was timely under Swiss legal principles. The panel emphasized its authority to conduct a full review of the case, rendering objections about the initial hearing’s fairness largely irrelevant. It dismissed claims of bias or procedural unfairness, noting insufficient evidence to support such allegations.
Regarding the sanction, the panel upheld the three-month ineligibility period, finding it proportionate and not grossly disproportionate to the offense. It dismissed D.'s argument that her subsequent world championship win should mitigate the sanction, as such ex post evaluations are inadmissible. The panel also acknowledged potential deficiencies in the IDSF's anti-doping environment but stressed this did not excuse violations. It encouraged the IDSF to improve anti-doping awareness and enforcement.
Finally, the panel ruled that the ten-day period during which D.'s provisional suspension was temporarily lifted should not be added to her ineligibility period, as the temporary lifting was not formally communicated to her. The ineligibility period thus ran uninterrupted from 14 September to 14 December 2006. The panel partially granted the appeal, modifying the IDSF’s decision only in regard to the calculation of the ineligibility period while confirming its duration. The decision underscores the importance of clear communication in disciplinary proceedings and reinforces the principle that athletes should not be penalized for administrative delays beyond their control.