The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) case 2006/A/1029 involved Maccabi Haifa FC appealing a decision by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) regarding training compensation for a player, Y., who had been loaned to Maccabi Haifa from Hapoel Beer Sheva before signing with Real Racing Club Santander. The central issue was whether Maccabi Haifa was entitled to training compensation for the period Y. was registered with them on loan. The CAS panel, composed of George Abela, Efraim Barak, and Bård Racin Meltvedt, addressed key legal principles, including the applicability of res judicata and the distinction between a player's training period and subsequent development. The panel clarified that res judicata does not apply to parties not involved in prior proceedings, meaning Maccabi Haifa's claim was not affected by an earlier CAS decision involving Hapoel Beer Sheva and Real Racing Club Santander.
The panel emphasized that training compensation under FIFA regulations is limited to the period up to the completion of a player's training, not their later professional growth. They referenced FIFA Circular Letter no. 801, which places the burden of proof on the club claiming the end of a player's training. Factors such as the player being a regular in the "A" team or being loaned for significant sums could indicate the completion of training. In this case, the CAS upheld the DRC's decision, agreeing that Y. had completed his training by July 1997 when he signed his first professional contract with Hapoel Beer Sheva, before his loan to Maccabi Haifa. The substantial loan fee further supported the conclusion that Y. was already a trained player by then.
Maccabi Haifa argued that they had significantly developed Y.'s skills during his loan period, presenting testimony from former coach Avraham Grant. However, the panel ruled that contributions to a player's development after their training period ends do not qualify for compensation. The respondent, Real Racing Club Santander, contended that Y. was already a professional at 17, evidenced by his performance and contract terms. The panel concluded that Y.'s training period ended by the 1996-1997 season, and while Maccabi Haifa contributed to his later development, this did not meet the criteria for training compensation.
Ultimately, the CAS dismissed Maccabi Haifa's appeal, reinforcing the principle that training compensation is only applicable for the period up to the completion of a player's training. The decision highlights the importance of evidence in establishing the end of a player's training period and the limited scope of training compensation under FIFA regulations. The case also clarified that res judicata applies only when the same parties, object, and cause are involved, ensuring legal consistency while protecting the rights of third parties not involved in prior disputes. The ruling upheld the DRC's decision, denying Maccabi Haifa's claim for training compensation.